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Abstract
We propose a secure voting protocol for score-
based voting rules, where independent talliers per-
form the tallying procedure. The protocol outputs
the winning candidate(s) while preserving the pri-
vacy of the voters and the secrecy of the ballots. It
offers perfect secrecy, in the sense that apart from
the desired output, all other information – the bal-
lots, intermediate values, and the final scores re-
ceived by each of the candidates – is not disclosed
to any party, including the talliers. Such perfect
secrecy may increase the voters’ confidence and,
consequently, encourage them to vote according to
their true preferences. The protocol is extremely
lightweight, and therefore it can be easily deployed
in real life voting scenarios.
1 Introduction
Ballot secrecy is an essential goal in the design of voting sys-
tems. When voters are concerned for their privacy, they might
decide to vote differently from their real preferences, or even
abstain from voting altogether. Our main goal here is achiev-
ing perfect ballot secrecy. The usual meaning of privacy in
the context of secure voting is that the voters remain anony-
mous. Namely, even though the ballots are known (as is the
case when opening the ballot box at the end of an election
day), no ballot can be traced back to the voter who cast it. We
go one step further and consider perfect ballot secrecy, or full
privacy [Chaum, 1988], i.e., given any coalition of voters, the
protocol does not reveal any information on the ballots, be-
yond what can be inferred from the published results.
The mere anonymity of the ballots might not provide suf-
ficient privacy and hence may encourage untruthful voting,
as our next two examples show. Consider a group of faculty
members who need to jointly decide which applicant to ac-
cept to the faculty out of a given list of candidates. To that
end, each faculty member (voter) anonymously casts a bal-
lot. A tallier counts the ballots and uses some voting rule
to determine the elected candidate(s). The problem with this
voting strategy is that even though the tallier cannot link vot-
ers to ballots, he does see the actual ballots. Hence, besides
the final outcome, say, that Alice is the elected candidate, the
tallier is exposed to additional informationwhich may be sen-
sitive; e.g., that the candidate Bob received no votes, even
though some of the voters declared upfront that they are go-
ing to vote for him. The imperfect privacy of such a voting
system may cause some voters to vote untruthfully. The pro-
tocol that we present herein offers perfect privacy and, thus,
may encourage voters to vote truthfully.
As another example, consider the London Inter-Bank Of-
fered Rate (LIBOR)1 which is the benchmark interest rate at
which banks can borrow from each other. The rate is com-
puted daily; banks that are benchmark submitters contribute
to setting the LIBOR by means of voting: each bank’s “vote”
is an interest rate and the LIBOR is determined by some av-
eraging over the submitted votes. The bank’s submitted rate
may signal the bank’s financial viability. Worrying about the
signal which their submitted rate conveys, some banks may
submit an untruthful rate. To prevent this, the bank’s indi-
vidual submissions (the ballots) are kept private and are pub-
lished only three months after the submission date. However,
the tallier is exposed to these ballots and may be able to link
some ballots to banks by financial analysis. Therefore, even
anonymous ballots might not provide sufficient privacy. Se-
curing the ballots, as we suggest herein, means that there is
less incentive to misrepresent one’s ballot, and thus there is
less incentive for strategic voting.
Contributions. We present a secure protocol with per-
fect ballot secrecy to compute election results for score-based
voting rules. This is achieved by employing cryptographic
multiparty computation techniques. Score-based voting rules
are rules where a voter’s ballot consists of scores given to
each of the candidates, and the winner is the candidate with
the highest aggregated score [Brandt et al., 2016]. This fam-
ily includes rules such as PLURALITY, RANGE, APPROVAL,
VETO, and BORDA. We follow what is known in cryptog-
raphy as ‘the mediated model” [Alwen et al., 2008], in the
sense that our protocol involves a set of talliers who perform
the aggregation of ballots and compute the final voting re-
sults, but they are not allowed to access the actual ballots or
other computational results such as the final scores of candi-
dates. Our protocol is secure against coalitions: in order to
infer any information on aggregated scores of candidates, at
least half of the talliers would need to collude, while in order
1See ICE LIBOR https://www.theice.com/iba/libor
to obtain the actual private ballots, all talliers would need to
collude. Such perfect ballot privacy, by which the ballots and
aggregated scores are not disclosed even to the talliers, may
increase the voters’ confidence and, consequently, encourage
them to vote according to their true preferences. As the pro-
tocol is compliant with all desired properties of secure voting
systems, and is very efficient, it can be readily implemented
in real life voting scenarios.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we re-
view related work. In Section 3 we provide the relevant
background on score-based voting rules and on secret sharing
schemes. Our protocol is presented and discussed in Section
4. In Section 5 we describe an important security enhance-
ment of our protocol. We analyze the costs of the protocol in
Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Related work
The issue of enhancing democratic elections is widely stud-
ied in the AI community and specifically in the compu-
tational social choice community. Some recent studies
look at securing attacks during the recounting of ballots
[Elkind et al., 2019], optimal attack problems in voting (e.g.
by deleting voters) [Dey et al., 2019], electoral bribery prob-
lem [Chen et al., 2019], election control through social influ-
ence [Coro` et al., 2019] and the complexity of multi-winner
voting rules [Yang, 2019]. A central goal in this context is the
design of systems in which the election results reflect prop-
erly and truthfully the will of the individuals in the underlying
society. An important vehicle towards achieving that goal is
to secure the voting system so that it provides desired proper-
ties such as anonymity/privacy, fairness, robustness, unique-
ness, and uncoercibility.
Previous studies on secure voting focused on different de-
sired properties, e.g. privacy, or anonymity (a ballot cannot be
connected to the voter who cast it), uniqueness (every voter
can vote once), correctness (the issued winners are the ones
that should be selected by the underlying voting rule from
the cast ballots), and fairness (all voters must cast their bal-
lot without seeing other votes or intermediate voting results).
See e.g. [Chang and Lee, 2006; ?; ?].
Our focus is on preserving privacy and achieving perfect
ballot secrecy. One way to achieve those goals is by using
methods that allow the voters to compute the outcome them-
selves without relying on a tallier to aggregate and count the
votes, e.g. [Benkaouz and Erradi, 2015]. Another way is to
use a third-party, a.k.a a tallier. In order to secure the transi-
tion of the votes which are sent from the voters to the tallier,
various cryptographic techniques were utilized in prior art.
Early studies used the notions of mix-nets and
anonymous channels [Chaum, 1988; Park et al., 1993;
Sako and Kilian, 1995]. Blind signatures [Chaum, 1982]
were used in other secure e-voting protocols, e.g.
[Fujioka et al., 1992; Ibrahim et al., 2003]. Chen et al.
[Chen et al., 2014] proposed a secure e-voting system based
on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Benaloh
[Benaloh, 1987] proposed a practical scheme for conducting
secret-ballot elections in which the outcome of an election is
verifiable by all participants and even by non-participating
observers; his scheme is based on secret sharing homomor-
phisms [Benaloh, 1986] that allow computations on shared
data.
A large number of studies utilized homomorphic encryp-
tion, as it enables voting aggregation in the ciphertext do-
main. For example, Cramer et al. [Cramer et al., 1997] pro-
posed a scheme in which each voter posts a single encrypted
ballot; owing to the homomorphism of the cipher, the final
tally is verifiable to any observer of the election. Damga˚rd et
al. [Damga˚rd et al., 2010] proposed a generalization of Pail-
lier’s probabilistic public-key system [Paillier, 1999] and then
showed how it can be used for efficient e-voting. While most
homomorphic e-voting schemes are based on additive homo-
morphism, Peng et al. [Peng et al., 2004] proposed a scheme
based on multiplicative homomorphism. In their scheme, the
tallier recovers the product of the votes, instead of their sum,
and then the product is factorized to recover the votes.
To the best of our knowledge, only two previous studies
considered the question of private execution of the compu-
tation that the underlying voting rule dictates. Canard et al.
[2018] considered the Majority Judgment (MJ) voting rule
[Balinski and Laraki, 2007], which does not fall under the
score-based family of rules that we consider here. They first
translate the complex control flow and branching instructions
that the MJ rule entails into a branchless algorithm; then they
devise a privacy-preserving implementation of it using ho-
momorphic encryption, distributed decryption schemes, dis-
tributed evaluation of Boolean gates, and distributed compar-
isons. Nair et al. [2015] suggest to use secret sharing for
the tallying process in Plurality voting. Their protocol pro-
vides anonymity but does not provide perfect secrecy as it
reveals the final aggregated score of each candidate. In ad-
dition, their protocol is vulnerable to cheating attacks, as it
does not include means for detecting illegal votes. In our
study, which covers all score-based rules, we provide perfect
privacy as well as means for preventing cheating by using a
secret sharing-based secure multiparty computation (see Sec-
tion 4.1).
3 Background
3.1 Score-based voting rules
We consider a setting in which there are N voters, V =
{V1, . . . , VN}, that need to hold an election over M candi-
dates, C = {C1, . . . , CM}. The election determines a score
w(m) for each candidate Cm, m ∈ [M ] := {1, . . . ,M} in a
manner that will be discussed below. Let K ∈ [M ] be some
fixed integral parameter. Then the output of the voting algo-
rithm is the subset of the K candidates with the highest w-
scores, where ties are broken either arbitrarily or by another
rule that is agreed upfront. (K = 1 corresponds to the typical
case of a single winner.) Our protocol can be easily extended
to output also the ranking of the candidates or the final scores
they received. As such extensions are straightforward, we fo-
cus here on the “lean” output consisting only of the identities
of theK elected candidates.
In score-based voting rules, every voter Vn, n ∈ [N ] :=
{1, . . . , N}, creates a ballot vector of the form wn :=
(wn(1), . . . ,wn(M)), where all single votes, wn(m), are
nonnegative and uniformly bounded. Define
w = (w(1), . . . ,w(M)) :=
N∑
n=1
wn . (1)
Then w(m) is the aggregated score of the candidateCm,m ∈
[M ].
We consider five types of voter inputs to be used in the
above described rule template, which give rise to five well
known voting rules [Nurmi, 2012]:
• PLURALITY. wn ∈ {e1, . . . , eM} where em, m ∈ [M ],
is an M -dimensional binary vector of which the mth entry
equals 1 and all other entries are 0. Namely, Vn casts a vote
of 1 for exactly one candidate and a vote of 0 for all others,
and the winner is the candidate who was the favorite of the
maximal number of voters.
• RANGE. wn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L}
M for some publicly known
L. 2 Here every voter gets to give a score, ranging from 0 to
L, to each candidate.
• APPROVAL. wn ∈ {0, 1}
M . Every voter submits a bi-
nary vector in which (up to)K entries are 1, while the remain-
ing entries are 0. Such a voting rule is used when it is needed
to fill K equivalent positions; for example, if K members in
the senate of a university retired, it is needed to selectK new
senate representatives from the faculty.
• VETO. wn ∈ {eˆ1, . . . , eˆM} where eˆm, m ∈ [M ], is an
M -dimensional binary vector of which the mth entry equals
0 and all other entries are 1. In this method every voter states
his least preferred candidate. The winner is the candidate that
got the minimal number of zero votes.
• BORDA. wn ∈ {(π(0), . . . , π(M − 1)) : π ∈
ΠM}, where ΠM is the set of all permutations over the set
{0, . . . ,M − 1}. Here, the input of each voter is his own or-
dering of the candidates, i.e., wn(m) indicates the position
of Cm in Vn’s order, where a position of 0 (resp. M − 1) is
reserved to Vn’s least (resp. most) favorite candidate.
3.2 Secret sharing
Secret sharing methods [Shamir, 1979] enable distributing a
secret among a group of participants. Each participant is
given a random share of the secret so that: (a) the secret can
be reconstructed only by combining the shares given to spe-
cific authorized subsets of participants, and (b) combinations
of shares belonging to unauthorized subsets of participants
reveal zero information on the underlying secret.
Our protocol utilizes a basic all-or-nothing secret sharing
scheme. Assuming that the secretw to be shared is a bounded
integer, we can view it as an element in a sufficiently large fi-
nite field Zp. In order to split the secret w among a group of
D participants, the owner of the secret selects, independently
and uniformly at random, D − 1 elements from Zp, denoted
w1, . . . , wD−1. He then sets wD := w−
∑D−1
d=1 wd mod p.
The valuewd is the share given to the dth participant, d ∈ [D].
2We note that RANGE is not commonly included in the family
of score-based voting rules, but we include it in this family since it
fits the same voting rule “template”. RANGE is common in many
applications, e.g. www.netflix.com and www.amazon.com, and it is
often used in recommender systems [Masthoff, 2011].
It is easy to see that the combination of all shares enables to
recover the secretw, sincew =
∑D
d=1 wd mod p. However,
any tuple ofD′ shares, whereD′ < D, reveals zero informa-
tion on w, since such tuples of shares distribute uniformly at
random in ZD
′
p .
Our protocol involves a distributed third party, T =
{T1, . . . , TD}, called the tallier (T) or talliers (Td, d ∈ [D] =
{1, . . . , D}). In the protocol, we use secret sharing for creat-
ing shares of the private ballots of the voters and distributing
them among the D talliers. As those ballots are vectors (see
Section 3.1), the secret sharing is carried out for each entry
independently, so that each of the talliers receives a (vector)
share in each ballot.
We note that our protocol may be easily modified
to work with Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme
[Shamir, 1979], instead of the above described all-or-nothing
scheme. In that variant, the shares are computed so that any
number of t < D talliers, for some predetermined threshold
t, can perform the tallying computation, in order to enhance
the robustness (also known as ‘availability’) of the system.
4 A secure protocol for score based rules
As indicated earlier, our protocol is mediated, in the sense that
it assumes a set of talliers, T = {T1, . . . , TD}, who assist in
the computations, but are not allowed to learn any informa-
tion on the private votes of the voters. The number of talliers,
D, can be any integerD > 1. Higher values ofD will imply
higher computational and communication costs, but they will
also imply greater security against coalitions of corrupted tal-
liers.
A privacy-preserving implementation of score-based rules
is described in Protocol 1. Before delving into that proto-
col, we make the following observation. For each of the five
score-based rules, there is a known upper boundB on the en-
tries of w. B = N in PLURALITY, APPROVAL, and VETO
rules, B = NM in BORDA, and B = NL in RANGE. Let
p be a fixed prime greater than B. Then all computations in
Protocol 1 are carried out in the field Zp.
First, each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], constructs his own ballot
vector (Step 1), wn ∈ (Zp)
M . We assume that all voters
know the index m ∈ [M ] of each candidate. For example,
that index can be determined by the lexicographical ordering
of the candidates according to their names. In Step 2, Vn
creates random additive shares of wn. Specifically, Vn selects
uniformly at randomD vectors in (Zp)
M such that their sum
equals wn. Letting wn,d be the dth share of wn, then
wn =
D∑
d=1
wn,d mod p . (2)
Subsequently, each Vn sends the dth share to Td, d ∈ [D]
(Step 3). After receiving the ballot shares from all voters,
Td computes the sum of all received vector shares wˆd =∑N
n=1 wn,d mod p (Step 4). Each such vector wˆd on its own
carries no information regarding the votes (since it is the sum
of uniformly random and independent vectors). But in view
of Eq. (1) and the way in which the share vectors wn,d were
generated (Step 2), we see that
w =
D∑
d=1
wˆd mod p , (3)
where w is the aggregated vector of scores.
The heart of the protocol is in Step 5: here, the talliers en-
gage in a secure multiparty computation (MPC) in order to
find the indices of the K candidates with the highest aggre-
gated scores. This is a non-trivial task since no one holds
the vector w. In Section 4.1 we explain the notion of MPC
and describe the MPC protocol that we use for the above de-
scribed task. Once those indices are found, the voters proceed
to find the identity of the K candidates behind those indices
(Step 6).
Protocol 1 A basic protocol for secure score-based voting
Input: wn, n ∈ [N ];K ∈ [M ].
Output: The K candidates from C with highest aggregated
scores in w =
∑N
n=1 wn.
1: Each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], constructs his ballot vector wn
according to the selected indexing and voting rule.
2: Each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], selects uniformly at random
D − 1 vectors wn,d ∈ (Zp)
M , 1 ≤ d ≤ D − 1, and then
sets wn,D =
(
wn −
∑D−1
d=1 wn,d
)
mod p.
3: Vn, ∀n ∈ [N ], sends wn,d to Td, ∀d ∈ [D].
4: Td, ∀d ∈ [D], computes wˆd =
∑N
n=1 wn,d mod p.
5: T1, . . . , TD find the indices of theK candidates in C with
highest w-scores and output them.
6: The voters find the identities of the topK candidates.
4.1 Sorting shared vectors
The main challenge in Step 5 of Protocol 1 is to find the in-
dices of the K largest entries in w without revealing any in-
formation on w’s entries. Towards that end, the talliers can
implement any sorting algorithm on w until allK largest en-
tries are found. To do so, the talliers need to compare entries
in w; alas, those entries are unknown to them, as the talliers
hold only random shares in them. This raises the question of
how such comparisons can be carried out without revealing
to the talliers the actual values that they obliviously compare.
Assume that the two entries that need to be compared are
u = w(n) and v = w(m) for some n,m ∈ [M ]. Each
tallier Td, d ∈ [D], holds random shares ud, vd ∈ Zp, such
that u =
∑D
d=1 ud mod p and v =
∑D
d=1 vd mod p. The
talliers wish to find whether v < u, but without revealing any
information beyond that on u and v.
To privately verify such questions, we use a secure mul-
tiparty computation (MPC) protocol [Yao, 1982]. An MPC
protocol allows T1, . . . , TD to compute any function f over
private inputs x1, . . . , xD that they hold, so that at the end of
the protocol everyone learns f(x1, . . . , xD) but nothing else.
A common approach towards designing efficient MPC proto-
cols is to represent the function f by an arithmetic circuit C
such that for every set of inputs, x1, . . . , xD , the output of the
circuit, C(x1, . . . , xD), equals f(x1, . . . , xD).
The circuit is composed of input and output gates such
that each input gate is fed with a single secret value by one
of the parties, and an output gate determines a single value
that is revealed to all parties (there could be multiple output
gates). Additionally, between the input and output gates there
are multiple layers of arithmetic gates that connect them. An
arithmetic gate can be either addition or multiplication. Each
gate is given exactly two inputs, and it produces one output
such that the output of a gate at layer ℓ can be given as input
to multiple gates in layer ℓ+1. (All input gates constitute the
first layer of the circuit.) Only the values that the output gates
issue are revealed to the parties; all intermediate values that
pass from one gate to another remain secret from everyone.
Specifically, a secure protocol allows the parties to maintain
the invariant that the actual value output from each gate is
secret-shared, as described in Section 3.2. When reaching
an output gate, each party broadcasts the corresponding share
that it holds, so that everyone can reconstruct the output.
The computational and communication costs of computing
such circuits depend mainly on the number of multiplication
gates and on the number of layers in the circuit, as we pro-
ceed to explain. To compute a multiplication gate of two se-
crets, s1 and s2, the parties have to interact; i.e., each party
needs to send some information to the other parties. How-
ever, to compute a multiplication gate of one secret s and
a public value c, the parties do not need to interact (such a
gate requires only local computation). The same holds for an
addition gate. Therefore, for the efficiency of secure compu-
tation, circuit designers are mostly concerned with the num-
ber of multiplication gates in the circuit and with the depth
of the circuit, i.e. the number of interactions that have to be
performed sequentially (since they depend on each other and
cannot be performed in parallel). Specifically, in this work
we use the design by Nishide and Ohta [2007], which outputs
the bit that indicates whether u < v by a circuit with a con-
stant depth (15 to be concrete). This is advantageous as the
depth does not depend neither on the number of parties nor on
the field size p, so changing those parameters does not have a
significant effect on performance (see Table 1 in Section 6).
4.2 The protocol’s security
Here we discuss the security of the whole protocol. An im-
portant goal of secure voting is to provide anonymity; namely,
it should be impossible to connect a ballot to the voter who
cast it. Protocol 1 achieves that goal since each cast ballot is
distributed into random shares and then each share is sent to a
different tallier. Each such share carries zero information on
the underlying ballot. Even subsets of d shares where d < D
reveal no information on the secret ballot. Hence, the talliers
never obtain access to the actual ballots and, consequently,
cannot infer anything about the way each voter voted. The
only way in which the ballot of a voter Vn can be recovered is
if all talliers collude and recover his ballot wn by adding all
of the corresponding shares, see Eq. (2).
Such a collusion scenario is highly improbable, and its
probability decreases as D increases. Ideally, the talliers
would be parties that enjoy high level of trust within the orga-
nization or state in which the elections take place, and whose
business is based on such trust. Betraying that trust may in-
cur devastating consequences for the talliers. Hence, even if
D is set to a low value such as D = 4 or even D = 3, the
probability of a total breakdown of trust in any conceivable
application scenario (with a proper selection of the talliers)
would be negligible.
Another possible attack scenario is as follows: a voter Vj
can eavesdrop on the communication link between another
voter Vn and each of the talliers, and intercept the messages
that Vn sends to the talliers (in Protocol 1’s Step 3) in order
to recover wn from them; additionally, Vj may replace Vn’s
originalmessages that carry shares ofwn with othermessages
(say, ones that carry shares of wj , or any other desired fake
ballot). Such an attack can be easily thwarted by requiring
each party (a voter or a tallier) to have a certified public key,
encrypt each message that he sends out using the receiver’s
public key and then sign it using his own private key; also,
when receiving messages, each party must first confirm them
using the public key of the sender and then send a suitable
message of confirmation to the receiver. Namely, each mes-
sage that a voter Vn sends to a tallier Td in Step 3 of Protocol
1 should be signed with Vn’s private key and then encrypted
by Td’s public key; and Td must acknowledge its receipt and
verification.
Finally, the security of the computation that the talliers
carry out in Step 5 of Protocol 1 is ensured by the proven
security of the underlying secure multiparty computation. By
utilizing that protocol, the talliers may find the indices of the
K winning candidates without learning any information be-
yond the order that the aggregated scores induce on the candi-
dates3. The security of that computation is guaranteed under
the assumption of an honest majority, namely, that if some of
the talliers collude, the number of colluding talliers is smaller
than D/2. So, for example, our voting protocol with D = 3
(resp. D = 5) talliers is secure unless at least two (resp.
three) of them collude. It is important to note that in case
there is a collusion between D/2 or more talliers, they could
obtain information on aggregated scores of candidates. How-
ever, in order to get information on private ballots of spe-
cific voters, all talliers have to collude, since those ballots are
shared through an all-or-nothing secret sharing scheme (Steps
2-3 of Protocol 1).
In view of the above discussion, the tradeoff in setting the
number of talliers D is clear: higher values of D provide
higher security since more talliers would need to be corrupted
in order to breach the system’s security. However, increasing
D has its costs: more independent and reputable talliers are
needed, and the communication and computational costs of
our protocol increase, albeit modestly (see Section 6).
A fundamental assumption in all secure voting systems that
rely on fully trusted talliers (that is, talliers who receive the
actual ballots from the voters) is that the talliers do not mis-
3The circuit that we use in order to verify inequalities may be
modified in order to hide intermediate comparison results and output
only theK indices of candidates with highest scores. Such a version,
which we do not describe herein due to lack of space, will output
only the K winning candidates without disclosing their order.
use the ballot information and that they keep it secret. In
contrast, our protocol significantly reduces the trust vested in
the talliers as it denies the talliers access to the actual ballots.
Even in scenarios where some (a minority) of the talliers be-
tray that trust, privacy is ensured. Such a reduction of trust in
the talliers is essential in order to increase the confidence of
the voters in the voting system so that they would be further
motivated to exercise their right to vote and moreover, vote
according to their true preferences, without fearing that their
private vote would be disclosed to anyone.
5 Validating the legality of the cast ballots
Protocol 1 is designed for honest voters, namely, voters who
cast legal votes. However, voters may attempt cheating by
submitting illegal ballots in order to help their candidate of
choice. For example, assume that Vn’s favorite candidate is
Cm and the voting rule is PLURALITY. Then a honest Vn
would cast the ballot wn = em (see Section 3.1). A dishonest
Vn, on the other hand, could cast the ballot wn = Nem. Such
an illegal ballot would boost Cm’s chances of winning, or, if
Vn is the only dishonest voter, it would even ensureCm’s win.
Similar options of cheating exist also with the other voting
rules. Since the talliers do not see the actual ballots, if a voter
can pull such a cheat, it might remain undetected.
In real-world voting scenarios, where voters typically cast
their ballots on certified computers in voting centers, the
chances of hacking such computers and tampering with the
software that they run are small. However, for full-proof se-
curity, we proceed to describe an MPC solution that enables
the talliers to validate the legality of each ballot, even though
those ballots remain hidden from them. In case a ballot is
found to be illegal, the talliers may recover it (by adding up all
shares) and use the recovered ballot as a proof of the voter’s
dishonesty.
Due to space limitations we focus herein only on PLURAL-
ITY. A ballot wn is legal in this case iff wn(m) < 2, i.e. if
wn(m) ∈ {0, 1}) for allm ∈ [M ], and
∑
m∈[M ] wn(m) = 1
mod p (assuming p > M ). Each of the abovem inequalities
can be verified by a circuit that outputs wn(m) ·(wn(m)−1).
The parties accept the vote wn(m) as legal (namely, being ei-
ther 0 or 1) iff the result is 0. Finally, verifying that there
exists exactly one entry in the vector wn with the value 1 is
done by computing the sum
∑
m∈[M ] wn(m) and verifying
that it equals 1.
Note that in order to validate u < c? for any constant c, we
can compute u(u − 1)(u − 2) . . . (u − c+ 1) (with a cost of
c− 1 multiplication gates) and verify equality to 0.
The treatment of RANGE, APPROVAL and VETO is similar.
The validation of BORDA rule is slightly more involved, but
it too relies solely on the cryptographic toolkit that we used
so far.
6 Computational and communication costs
The costs for each voter are negligible, as a voter needs only
to generateM(D−1) log2 p random bits, performM(D−1)
additions in Zp, and then send D messages of M log2 p bits
each (Protocol 1, Steps 2-3). As for the talliers, the cost in
Step 4 is negligible ((N−1)M additions inZp), but the deter-
mination of the winners (Step 5) is more costly as it invokes
a protocol for secure comparison. The number of multipli-
cation gates in the comparison circuit is 279 · log p + 5 in a
circuit of depth 15. A secure evaluation of a multiplication
gate incurs a communication of log p bits per tallier, thus, the
overall communication per tallier is roughly 279 · log2 p bits.
We evaluated the runtime of performing such a comparison
by D ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9} talliers over Amazon AWS m5.4xlarge
machines at N. Virginia over a network with bandwidth
9.6Gbps. We performed our evaluations when the bound
B on aggregated scores is smaller than a Mersenne prime
p ∈ {p1 := 2
13 − 1, p2 := 2
31 − 1}. Namely, in cases where
there are few voters, or ballots’ entries are small, and then
B < p1, we can use p = p1; otherwise, we can take p = p2,
which seems to suffice for all conceivable application scenar-
ios. Using Mersenne primes is advantageous in the context
of secure computation, since multiplication of two field ele-
ments can be done without performing an expensive division.
The results are presented in the first two rows of Table 1.
D 3 5 7 9
p = p1 = 2
13
− 1 2.83 4.3 6.6 12.81
p = p2 = 2
31
− 1 9.07 9.54 9.64 15.0
Verifying 5 · 104 ballot entries 41.3 42.2 52.9 65.55
Table 1: Time (milliseconds) for a secure comparison protocol with
varying number of talliers, D, and two field sizes, p1 and p2. The
3rd row refers to a batch verification of 5 · 104 ballot entries.
For ballot verification, as described in Section 5, we need a
circuit that checks whether u < 2. As explained there, such a
circuit requires only one multiplication gate and has depth 1.
In addition, to verify that there is only one ballot entry with
the value 1, we need only to perform summation, which re-
quires no multiplication gates. Overall, a verification circuit
of q ballots requires exactly qM multiplication gates in one
layer. We extrapolated the runtime for executing the verifica-
tion circuit from the experimental results reported by Chida
et al. [2018]. They experimented on a similar network set-
ting (over AWS EC2 machines), but used a larger field with
p = 261 − 1. For a circuit with 106 multiplication gates
that were spread evenly over 20 layers, they report runtimes
of {826, 844, 1058, 1311} milliseconds when the number of
parties, D, is {3, 5, 7, 9}, respectively. Hence, the runtime
of executing 106/20 = 5 · 104 multiplication gates in a sin-
gle layer is obtained by dividing the above runtimes by 20, as
shown in the third row of Table 1. In fact, those runtimes con-
stitute an upper bound on the actual runtimes for our applica-
tion, since they were obtained with a field size of p = 261− 1
that is larger than p1 or p2 that suffice for our needs.
Such runtimes indicate that our protocol is extremely
lightweight. Indeed, the tallying process at the end of the
election period can be completed in few seconds, even in elec-
tions over hundreds of candidates. As for the validation of re-
ceived ballots, the above numbers indicate that even if we use
a high number of D = 9 talliers, and assume a high number
of M = 50 candidates, the talliers can verify the ballots of
one million voters in under 70 seconds.
7 Conclusion
We considered a setting in which a group of voters wishes
to elect K candidates out of a given list of candidates. We
considered score-based rules and showed how to securely
compute the winners using a secure multiparty protocol.
Our protocol offers perfect ballot secrecy. In particu-
lar, the ballots themselves are kept secret and even the tal-
liers do not obtain them. This perfect secrecy may increase
the confidence of the voters in the voting system, so that
they would be encouraged to participate in the elections and
vote truthfully without fearing that their private vote would
be disclosed to anyone else. Furthermore, our technique
can be used during iterative voting [Airiau and Endriss, 2009;
Lev and Rosenschein, 2016; Meir et al., 2010]. If, during it-
erative voting, the candidates’ scores are kept secret from all
parties, then voters would not obtain from the voting process
information that could have been used for strategic voting.
(Of course, the perfect secrecy of our protocol cannot stop
strategic voting altogether, since voters may still base strate-
gic voting on information from polls, rumors and other com-
munication channels.)
The protocol complies with conventional security
desiderata, such as anonymity/privacy, fairness, robust-
ness, uniqueness, completeness and uncoercibility. (See
[Chang and Lee, 2006] for a full list and definitions of
those properties.) An analysis of its computational and
commutation costs shows that it is practical as it is extremely
lightweight. The protocol is based solely on existing cryp-
tographic arsenal. This is a prominent advantage of our
protocol; indeed, protocols that can be implemented on
top of existing libraries are advantageous over protocols
that require the development, scrutiny and assimilation of
new cryptographic components and, therefore, might be
unattractive to practitioners.
Lastly, in this work we focused on single-round score-
based voting rules. In the future we intend to apply the tech-
niques which we used here in order to secure order-based vot-
ing rules and multi-round voting rules.
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